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Supermajority in Parliamentary Systems –  
A Concept of Substantive Legislative Supermajority:  
Lessons from Hungary
Zoltán PoZsár-sZentmiklósy*
Abstract. This paper focuses on the theoretical grounds of supermajority, its special relevance in parliamentary 
systems and the related experiences from Central and Eastern Europe, especially Hungary.
In parliamentary systems, the support of the parliamentary majority is a necessity and sufficient condition 
for governance – there is no need for supermajoritarian decision-making in issues of daily politics. A qualified 
majority has a different function and is an internal institutional limit of the legislative power – protecting the 
minority interests against the unilateral decisions of the majority in the most important issues of the political 
community.
The Hungarian situation from 2010–2015 demonstrates that minorities cannot influence the decisions where 
the supermajority represents a one-party opinion. Moreover, decisions of the supermajority can block future 
modifications of the future parliamentary majority as well. It will be argued in this paper that only a substantive 
approach to supermajority can support its basic function.
Keywords: parliamentary systems, legislative supermajority, protection of minorities, substantive approach
1. IDENTIFYING THE CHALLENGE
The concept of supermajority or qualified majority can be found in the practice of numerous 
parliaments. Constitutional amendments, legislative acts in some areas of law specified in 
constitutions, e.g. organic laws in France and Spain, and even the election of certain 
government officials, leaders of independent state organs or judges often require the support 
of higher proportion of MPs than ordinary decisions in parliaments. It is common in these 
decisions that they are related to issues which have high importance – both from the 
constitutional and political point of view.
It is appropriate to examine constitutional amendments separately from the above 
mentioned decisions of the legislature as, from the theoretical point of view, the constituent 
power and the constitution-amending power are always distinct from the legislative power. 
There are also various types of amendment rules, including ones which are very similar to 
ordinary parliamentary decisions.
A supermajority, however, is not a necessary requirement related to the most important 
decisions of legislation. Many constitutions do not prescribe special legislative topics which 
would need higher support than the majority.1 Similarly, in some cases only political culture 
and non-binding rule guides the legislature to build up wide support when electing or 
appointing office-holders.2 Countries which do not have a long-standing democratic 
tradition, like Hungary and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, cannot base their 
* assistant professor, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest) Faculty of Law, Department 
of Constitutional Law. E-mail: pozsarz@ajk.elte.hu
1 One can mention the Basic Law for the Federal Republic Germany, the Constitution Acts of 
Canada, the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Constitution of Finland. 
2 The appointment procedure of the Nordic and common law supreme courts is often guided by 
constitutional tradition. See: The Composition of Constitutional Courts (1997) 1.3.
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practice only on political culture. In their case, supermajority requirements, which bind the 
parliament, are constitutional safeguards against the exclusive and excessive use of power 
of a certain political group.
In Hungary, the conservative political parties (Fidesz3 and KDNP4) formed the 
governing coalition with two-thirds majority of the parliamentary seats between 2010 and 
2015.5 During this period, the National Assembly, by using the supermajority power, 
enacted the new constitution of the country, dozens of cardinal acts and elected a number of 
government officials, leaders of independent state organs and justices of the Constitutional 
Court.6 All these enactments were supported exclusively by the governing coalition. Even if 
the constitution-making process and constitutional amendments are not taken into 
consideration, the question arises whether this use of the legislative power is in accordance 
with the basic function of supermajority.
For the purposes of this analysis, the explanation offered by John O. McGinnis and 
Michael B. Rappaport will be used. In their view, supermajority in general can be considered 
as a constraint on the legislative power.7
The paper focuses on the theoretical grounds of supermajority, its special relevance in 
parliamentary systems and the related experiences from Central and Eastern Europe, 
especially Hungary. A possible approach to supermajority which supports its basic function 
based on these findings, will also be presented.
2. THE FUNCTION OF SUPERMAJORITY
Why are constraints on the majoritarian decision-making of the legislative power needed? 
What are the motives behind this idea?
Majoritarian decision-making is inevitable in democracies. In modern societies, which 
are divided by different experiences, preferences and opinions of their members, there is no 
better option to reach a decision which represents the presumed interest of the community. 
This is also true in the case of elected bodies when taking into account the functioning of 
representative democracy. If representative bodies (parliaments) are formed based on free 
and fair elections, then the majoritarian decisions of these, from the formal point of view, 
can be considered without doubt legitimate.
However, the support of the majority is not the only requirement related to decision-
making in modern democratic societies. The famous phrase of Alexis de Tocqueville about 
the ‘tyranny of the majority’8 demonstrates that the interests of the actual majority in some 
3 Alliance of Young Democrats.
4 Christian Democratic People’s Party.
5 This period includes two parliamentary terms: 2010–2014 and the first year of the 2014–2018 
term. Then the governing coalition lost its two-thirds majority due to two consecutive by-elections 
organised in single-member constituencies.
6 Regarding the activity of the justices of the Constitutional Court elected in 2011 see: Analysis 
of the Performance of Hungary’s ‘One-Party Elected’ Constitutional Court Judges between 2011 and 
2014. (2014) 
7 As a decision-making rule, supermajority differs both from ordinary (majoritarian) decision-
making and absolute constitutional limitations (e.g. clauses on the protection of certain fundamental 
rights). See: McGinnis and Rappaport (1999) 399–402.
8 See Democracy in America (1946) Chapter 15 199–214. James Madison is often cited in this 
regard as well. [See The Federalist Papers (1961) Federalist no 10.]. However, the assumption that in 
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cases can counter the rights or interests of minorities in a way which is not acceptable. This 
is the case when fundamental rights are limited, other constitutional values are infringed or 
certain minorities simply do not have the chance to raise their voice. Rules which function 
as safeguards and techniques related to the decision-making process can also effectively 
prevent such situations. In the case of parliaments, the veto power of the head of the state 
and the possible judicial review of the legislative decisions are traditional external limits of 
majoritarian power. The open debate in parliament which can deliberate alternative opinions 
(including the work in committees and even the possibility of filibuster) and supermajority 
requirements can be considered to be internal limits of the majority. All these lead to a 
decision-making process which is not only legitimate and democratic from the formal point 
of view but also represents substantive democratic values.
Supermajority rules, according to this classic approach, can protect the interests of 
minority groups. Minority groups can have not only the chance to raise their voice but also 
the possibility to take part in the decisions as some decisions require the support of more 
than a simple majority of MPs. Conversely, the classic critical approach argues that in these 
cases minorities can even block decisions and that is why their votes, from the substantive 
point of view, have more weight, in contradiction to the equality of mandates.9
These approaches can be systematized based on a deeper analysis as well. James M. 
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, in their classic book (1962) combining economics and 
political theory, refer to the effects of qualified majority voting: ‘the expected external costs 
would be reduced, but the decision-making costs would be increased’10 – the aggravation of 
the decision-making procedure leads to more stable results.
In recent years (2014), Melissa Schwartzberg published an impressive book in which 
she analyses the origins and effects of supermajority from the point of view of political 
theory and social choice theory.11 According to her approach, there are three justifications 
of the supermajority rule: the fostering of consensus; increasing institutional stability and 
providing protection to minorities. Her opinion is that there are normatively superior 
decision-making procedures that also achieve these aims, without suffering the normative 
drawbacks of supermajoritarianism – the most important being the undemocratic character 
as it provides a minority with a veto.12
Adrian Vermuele in his review on Schwartzberg’s book13 expressed further important 
arguments related to the supermajority dilemma. He argues that
simple majority rule is the only approach that respects equal treatment of voters 
(anonymity) and equal treatment of the options before the group (neutrality). 
Supermajority rule, by contrast, in its ordinary form violates neutrality, because it 
Federalist 10 Madison referred to the protection of the rights of minorities is contestable. Anthony 
McGann argues that Madison did not depart from the majority rule as ‘the only solution to majority 
tyranny given in Federalist 10 is to have a large “extended republic” where a single cohesive majority 
(which could dominate everyone else) would not exist’. See McGann (2006) 91, 111.
  9 See Sajó (1999) 138.
10 Buchanan and Tullock (1999) 155.
11 Schwartzberg (2014) 216.
12 See Tipler (2016) 5.
13 Vermuele (2014).
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privileges one of the options – the status quo option of leaving everything as it is, an 
option that will become the group choice so long as a sufficient minority supports it.14
Vermuele doubts whether supermajority rules can protect minorities as the question 
depends on ‘who “the minority” is or will be’.15
It is worth noting that the argument that supermajority rules violate neutrality (as 
described above) can also be challenged. Michael B. Rappaport, referring to his analysis 
written with John O. McGinnis (mentioned above), argues that ‘all that the violation of the 
neutrality condition shows is that there is a privileging of a decision (as compared to 
majority rule) and that this privileging needs a justification’. In his view, it is possible to 
justify such privilegization in exceptional cases.16
Regardless of which argument is given priority, all interpretations fit into the concept 
of supermajority as a constraint on the legislative power.17 And the protection of minority 
interests seems to be the most significant motive behind these constraints. Critical 
approaches do not challenge this function but are rather sceptical about its efficiency in this 
regard and accord more weight to majority decisions composed by identical and equal 
individual opinions.
3. SUPERMAJORITY IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
The function of protecting minorities can be more visible when attention turns to 
parliamentary systems regarding the question of legislative supermajority. It is in the very 
nature of the parliamentary systems that a government can only act with the support of the 
parliamentary majority.18 The executive must answer to the legislative branch, which has 
the power to bring the mandate of the government to an end by submitting a motion of no 
confidence with a simple majority vote. The executive power (or the head of the state) 
usually has the power to dissolve the parliament when there is no majority which can 
support government. Within these circumstances, (simple) majority voting is the essence of 
governing whereas qualified majority is always an exception.
In this respect, there is a serious challenge of basic parliamentary model. Bruce 
Ackerman describes that ‘(I)t is wrong (...) to suppose that every electoral victory marks a 
broad and deep mandate from the People for the leading proposals set out by the victorious 
party or coalition.’ Furthermore, ‘(T)he Westminster system cements this mistake into 
constitutional law by awarding plenary lawmaking authority to the victors regardless of the 
quality of their electoral majority.’19 Ackerman argued that it is essential to have constraints 
against the presumed limitless power of the parliamentary majority, like the referenda and 
the possibility of judicial review.20
14 See Vermuele (2014) (This argument is called May’s Theorem in literature.).
15 See Vermuele (2014).
16 Rappaport (2014).
17 See the reference to John O. McGinnis’s and Michael B. Rappaport’s work in the introduction 
part.
18 This feature can be defined as the ‘essence of parliamentarism’. See Bradley and Pinelli 
(2012) 651.
19 See Ackerman (2000) 665.
20 See Ackerman (2000) 668.
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At this point it is worth looking back to the English roots of parliamentarism. Even 
Albert Venn Dicey, a great supporter of parliamentary sovereignty recognizes that the 
parliamentary power has external and internal limits. The possibility that the people will 
disobey or resist the laws21 can be considered to be an external limit, while the attitude of 
the decision-makers toward public affairs, bound by the historical circumstances and the 
morality of the society,22 is an internal limit. However, his assessment nowadays seems to 
be too optimistic when stating that ‘the permanent wishes of the representative portion of 
Parliament can hardly, in the long run differ from the wishes of the English people or at any 
rate of the electors; that which the majority of the House of Commons command, the 
majority of the English people usually desire.’23
Ackerman is right when arguing for institutional constraints of the parliamentary 
majority – his approach focuses on solutions which are related to the principle of separation 
of powers. [In part II. of this paper I have called similar techniques (the veto power of the 
head of the state and the possible judicial review of the legislative decisions) external limits 
of the power of the parliamentary majority.] Taking also into consideration Dicey’s 
approach, these should be labeled external institutional limits. However, internal institutional 
limits (rules related to the decision-making process of parliament including supermajority 
voting rules) also should be taken into consideration.
Both external and internal institutional limits have special relevance in parliamentary 
systems as they can frustrate the parliamentary majority and also have an impact on the 
position of the government. When the effects of these limits are too strong, the government 
is forced to make political changes in order to maintain the confidence of the parliamentary 
majority. The parliamentary majority by definition supports the government as long as it 
has their confidence whilst parliamentary minority groups act as watchdogs.24 Party 
discipline is also very strict in parliamentary systems25 and in most of the cases, every 
single opposition MP will act according to this role. Internal institutional limits can support, 
in this regard, parliamentary minority groups only if these function effectively. In 
parliamentary systems, ordinary majoritarian decisions have more weight in expressing the 
will of the majority. That is why the constraints of the majoritarian decision-making have 
more relevance in the protection of minority interests. These particularities of the 
parliamentary model do not exclude compromises between majority and minority groups in 
important cases. A classic argument demonstrates that the dynamics of the parliamentary 
democracy is based on the possibility of interchange of positions of these groups which 
sustains the compromise between them.26
21 See Dicey (1886) 70.
22 See Dicey (1886) 73–74.
23 See Dicey (1886) 77.
24 Regarding the role of minority groups see the assessment of Professor Currie on the German 
experiences. Currie (2008) 2147.
25 See Bradley and Pinelli (2012) 658.
26 Professor Basset assumes that ‘(M)ajority and minority alike are themselves based largely 
upon compromise, and the compromise between them secured and necessitated by their interchange 
of positions is only the last stage of a long series and forms a starting point for new series. The 
process in continuous.’ Basset (1965) 125–26.
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4. THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS RELATED TO THE SUPERMAJORITY 
IN HUNGARY 2010–2015
In 1989–1990, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, Central and Eastern European countries 
built their constitutional system on popular sovereignty; separation of powers; the rule of 
law and the protection of human rights. The transition from authoritarian regimes dominated 
by a single party to stable democracy is not a quick process as it takes time until basic 
constitutional principles dominate the daily practice of the state organs and political culture 
deepens.
In Hungary, the 1989 Constitution prescribed a two-thirds majority of the MPs present 
at the sitting of the National Assembly for enacting laws that could be considered as ‘areas 
that present the greatest risk of abuse by a ruling coalition in a state characterized by 
remnants of Communism’.27 The idea behind this concept was that the two-thirds majority 
rule will force governing and opposition parties to reach a compromise in these issues. The 
selection of these topics was not solely based on special constitutional relevance but also on 
their political weight, given that none of the political parties had confidence in its fellows. 
Accordingly, these laws were not of a higher rank than ordinary laws in the legal system.28 
Ordinary laws, according to the very nature of parliamentary systems, required a simple 
majority. ‘Two-thirds majority acts’ were considered to have higher political importance, as 
they typically regulated the exercise of certain fundamental rights and the legal status of the 
most important state organs. The Constitutional Court also expressed that the ‘two-third 
majority acts’ had the function to build up wide political support, different from the 
majority.29 However, it was controversial that, at the same time, other fundamental rights 
and state organs (considered to have less political weight) were regulated in ordinary laws.30
The new Fundamental Law of Hungary, which entered into force on the 1st of January 
2012, has kept this technique by prescribing the support of two-thirds majority of the MPs 
present at the sitting of the National Assembly (relative supermajority) in the case of 
cardinal acts. At present, 27 topics shall be regulated in cardinal acts.31 The same relative 
supermajority rule is applied for enacting the Standing Orders of the Parliament and in the 
case of 29 other decisions, distinct from the legislative topics mentioned above. Furthermore, 
in 16 other cases (mostly election of heads of independent state organs) two-thirds of all 
MPs (absolute supermajority) is required for a decision to be adopted. In one special case, 
support of four–fifth of the MPs present is required.32 One can conclude that supermajority 
27 Ethan Klingsberg refers to media, military, police, local self-government, religion, ethnic 
minorities, citizenship, national security. See Klingsberg (1993) 47.
28 There are also scholar works which contest this approach, arguing that ‘two-thirds majority 
laws’ were of higher rank than ordinary laws. See Jakab (2007). 
29 See Decision 4/1993. (II. 12.) CC, part II. It is worth mentioning that the critique of the 
institution of the ‘two-third acts’ (both from the legal and political point of view) also appeared al in a 
dissenting opinion. See: Dissenting opinion of Justice Péter Schmidt, Decision 4/1993. (II. 12.) CC.
30 For a general analysis of the decision-making competences of the National Assembly in the 
examined period see: Smuk (2008).
31 Jakab and Szilágyi (2016) 4–7. One can add that due to the coincidence of the topics 
regulated, the list of cardinal acts on the website of the Hungarian National Assembly contains 32 
items. See: Sarkalatos törvények jegyzéke (2015).
32 Deviating from the provisions of the Standing Orders.
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rules are present in a significant proportion in the present decision-making practice of the 
Hungarian National Assembly. 33
At this point, it is worth having a look at the experiences of two other countries from 
the region which are in a similar position: the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Both countries 
have a parliamentary system of government (like Hungary), operate with some legislative 
acts which need supermajority (like the Hungarian cardinal acts) and experienced the 
transition period with similar conditions. The Czech Republic (as a member of 
Czechoslovakia), for a short period between 1990–1992, experienced that one party (the 
Civic Forum) won 62% of the parliamentary seats. The major parties won parliamentary 
seats in very similar proportions in all other parliamentary elections, in none of the cases 
forming governing coalitions with a supermajority in the Chamber of Deputies.34 
In Slovenia, since 1990, all governments have been coalition governments.35 No situation 
arose in which the governing parties could pass decisions in Parliament which require 
supermajority without the support of the opposition parties.
Contrary to the abovementioned experiences from the region, in Hungary the parties 
forming the present governing coalition maintained supermajority of the parliamentary 
seats on their own between 2010 and 2015.36 There was no need for the support of the 
opposition parties in the most important constitutional and political issues – these questions 
were decided exclusively by the governing coalition. As mentioned previously, during this 
period the National Assembly – by using the supermajority power – enacted the new 
constitution of the country, dozens of cardinal acts and it elected a number of government 
officials, leaders of independent state organs including the president of the Curia (the 
Supreme Court of Hungary), justices and president of the Constitutional Court.
The Fundamental Law entered into force in 2012 and since then, the nature of cardinal 
acts and the constitutional politics related to them has changed in Hungary. Taking into 
consideration the subjects of the regulation, there is a shift from mostly consent-orientated 
issues to typical topics of governance, e.g., family legislation, social or taxation policy. 
Furthermore, the Government, with the exclusive support of its supermajority in the 
National Assembly, proposed the creation of new cardinal acts and the amendment of 
existing ones as a matter of daily politics. In this regard, the cardinal acts – similarly to the 
two-thirds acts of the transition period – still represent topics which ‘present the greatest 
risk of abuse of power by a ruling coalition’37 and have at their roots the absence of 
33 For a detailed list of decisions requiring qualified majority see: Voting: Decisions requiring a 
qualified majority (2017).
34 After the 2006 parliamentary elections even a deadlock occurred, given the fact that none of 
the rival political parties (together with their possible allies) could have the support of more than 100 
MPs in the 200 seat Chamber of Deputies. See: Civic Democrats win largest share of popular vote; 
election ends in deadlock (2006).
35 See Governments of the Republic of Slovenia (2014).
36 In the period between 1994–1998 the governing socialist and liberal coalition had also two-
thirds majority in the National Assembly and in exceptional cases also used its supermajority power 
exclusively. However, the governing parties refused to bear the whole political responsibility for the 
enactment of a new constitution, therefore the constitution-drafting process was designed to involve 
opposition parties as well. The process was time-consuming and at the end of the parliamentary term 
the participants lost their interest in cooperation. For a detailed analysis see Arato and Miklósi (2010) 
370–72.
37 See Klingsberg (1993) 47.
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confidence in other political actors. However, the political circumstances are clearly 
different from those of the transition period. Before the transition, the political actors 
specified those legislative topics which required two-thirds majority as a result of a 
compromise, while the legislative topics which shall be regulated in cardinal acts were 
specified in the Fundamental Law unilaterally by the governing political side. The Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe underlined that (a) in many cases there is no 
justification for the requirement of two-thirds majority, (b) due to their nature, many issues 
regulated by cardinal acts should have been left to ordinary legislation and majoritarian 
politics and (c) there is a risk that the actual two-thirds majority can cement its political 
preferences.38
The practice described above contradicts the philosophy of parliamentarism.39 
According to the very nature of the parliamentary systems, a government can only act with 
the support of the parliamentary majority. In this regard, the support of the parliamentary 
majority is a necessary and sufficient condition for governance – there is no need for 
supermajoritarian decision-making in issues of daily politics. Qualified majority has a 
different function – as an internal institutional limit of the legislative power – protecting the 
minority interests against the unilateral and arbitrary decisions of the majority in the most 
important issues of the political community, e.g., fundamental rights, the basic structure of 
the constitutional organs, basic constitutional values.
The Hungarian experience in the recent years does not fit this interpretation, rather it 
demonstrates that in cases where the supermajority represents one party, opinion minorities 
cannot influence the decisions.40 Moreover, decisions of the supermajority can block future 
modifications by a future parliamentary majority as well. It is especially unique that in the 
present Hungarian case the governing coalition blocked itself because the actual majority is 
not a supermajority anymore.41
The governing coalition’s loss of its supermajority power has led to a situation where 
it can no longer pass exclusively absolute supermajority decisions. The election of the new 
justices of the Constitutional Court on 22 November 2016 was the first case the governing 
coalition had to reach an agreement with one of the opposition parties in an absolute 
supermajority case.42 Given the fact that cardinal acts (many of these regulating issues of 
daily politics) require a relative supermajority, the modification of these can pass in the 
future with the exclusive support of the governing coalition if there are more opposition 
MPs absent from voting than members of the governing side – a condition which is highly 
unlikely.
There is a slight chance to get occasional support from the opposition for the proposals 
of the government requiring supermajority in parliament.43 Belonging to the governing or 
38 See Opinion on the New Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011) 22–27.
39 According to Hans Kelsen, ‘(P)arlamentarism means government by a collegial organ 
democratically elected by the People based on universal, equal suffrage and the principle of majority.’ 
Kelsen (2013) 48.
40 Many scholars argue that even the formal use of supermajority power to make transformative 
changes to the Constitution was undemocratic from a substantive point of view. See Kis (2012) 1–21.
41 In the parliamentary term 2014–2018, since the by-elections of 2015.
42 See Parliament elects 4 top court judges, new chief (2016).
43 The sixth amendment to the Fundamental Law on ‘terror threat situation’ (14 June 2016) 
passed, while the proposed seventh amendment on the ‘prohibition of settlement of foreign population 
in the territory of Hungary’ failed (8 November 2016). 
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the opposition side is a core element of identity of parliamentary parties and, like in other 
parliamentary systems, party discipline is very strict in the Hungarian National Assembly. 
As a consequence, not only the protection of minorities but the majoritarian decision-
making itself, ‘the essence of parliamentarism’44 can face difficulties.
5. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: TAKING THE FUNCTION  
OF SUPERMAJORITY SERIOUSLY
The experiences described above underline that the level of support required in a vote is not 
the only difference between majoritarian and supermajoritarian parliamentary decisions. 
A supermajority – as a constraint of the majoritarian legislative power – also has the 
substantive function of reaching a compromise between the governing side and the 
opposition in the most important cases.45 This function is central in issues which protect 
genuine minority interests and the basics of the constitutional structure, e.g. fundamental 
rights, the status of independent state organs and constitutional values. However, as the 
Hungarian example demonstrates, if this function is not explicitly guaranteed by law, a 
supermajority used in a formal way can ultimately undermine the values it is supposed to 
protect.
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